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REPARATION RIGHTS TAX RELIEF RESTORES 
HUMAN RIGHTS AS A CIVIL RIGHT IN TAX 
TORT REFORM 
Professor Laura A. Quigley*† 
“[D]amages that aim to substitute for a victim’s physical or 
personal well-being-[are] personal assets that the Government 
does not tax and would not have taxed had the victim not lost 
them.”1   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. The 1996 Act Makes Nonphysical Personal Injury, Such as Discrimination 
Cases, Taxable 
The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 (“1996 Act”) made 
damages from discrimination cases taxable, including recoveries for 
emotional distress.2  This particular result arose from Congress’s effort to 
raise revenue that would offset the provisions to increase the minimum 
wage3 and reversed the tax doctrines that the Supreme Court, the 
Treasury Department, and Congress itself had established from 1918–
1996.  Even as he signed the 1996 Act into law, President Clinton noted 
his reservations about the revenue offset provision in a comment that 
summarizes the heart of the problem:  “Such damages are paid to 
compensate for injury, whether physical or not, and are designed to 
make victims whole, not to enrich them. These damages should not be 
considered a source of taxable income.”4   
                                                          
*  Visiting Assistant Professor of Law:  Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of 
Law, Orlando, FL (8/04–8/05); Paralegal Program Director/Professor Florida Metropolitan 
University-South Campus, Orlando, FL; M.L.T. (L.L.M. Tax) Georgetown University Law 
Center, 1981; J.D. William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, 1975; B.A. Economics, 
College of William & Mary, 1972. 
†  The author would like to thank the following colleagues for their helpful comments:  
Professors Judith Koons, Leonard Birdsong, Stephen Tropp, and Fred Jonassen.  The author 
also acknowledges the contribution of two research assistants, Dorothy LaGamba and 
Joshua Smith, who were funded by Barry University School of Law. 
1  O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 86 (1996). 
2 Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. 
§ 104(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996)) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2002)). 
3 Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1928–29 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. 
§ 104(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996)) (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2002)). 
4 President’s Signing Statement, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1475 (Aug. 26, 1996), 
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1862–64. 
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In analyzing the 1996 Act’s taxation of emotional distress recoveries 
in discrimination cases, this Article finds that Congress overstepped its 
constitutional authority by making these emotional distress recoveries an 
item of income.  By conducting a review of the legislative, 
administrative, constitutional, and judicial history of gross income and 
the exclusion from income for personal injuries and reparation rights tax 
relief, this Article shows that emotional distress recoveries are not items 
of income and cannot be taxed.  This Article also explains that the 
taxation of emotional distress recoveries under the 1996 Act originated 
from the tension between the civil rights movement and tort reform. 
B.  Overview of Parts II–VI 
Part II of this Article focuses on the legislation and legislative history 
of §§  61(a) and 104(a)(2) as they relate to dignitary torts.  This Part 
establishes that the meaning of income is a constitutional concept, not a 
statutory concept.  Part III of this Article then combines the 
administrative history of personal injury recoveries and reparation rights 
recoveries.  This Part emphasizes the similarities between personal injury 
and reparation rights recoveries to indicate that both types of recoveries 
are not income. 
Part IV of this Article concentrates on the unconstitutional aspects of 
taxing emotional distress recoveries as income items.  This Part shows, 
under the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis, that emotional distress 
recoveries are not income and that a tax on these recoveries is a 
capitation or direct tax.  Part V of this Article reviews the tension 
between the civil rights movement and tort reform.  This Part displays 
the inconsistent treatment of emotional distress recoveries by tort 
reformers, who limit these recoveries as noneconomic damages while 
Congress taxes these recoveries as economic damages. 
Part VI of this Article concludes that legislative, administrative, and 
judicial history indicate precedent supporting the conclusion that, under 
a variety of tax doctrines, emotional distress recoveries, like reparation 
rights recoveries, are not income items in the constitutional sense.  These 
tax doctrines concern the legal concepts of the return of human capital, 
the reimbursement for the loss of personal or civil rights, the “in lieu of” 
test, and horizontal equity.  Under each of these tax doctrines, the taxing 
of emotional distress recoveries as income is unconstitutional.  Finally, 
this Part shows how excluding emotional distress recoveries from 
income in nonphysical personal injuries would help to eliminate the 
English common law sexual stereotypes surrounding mental injuries’ 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 1 [2005], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss1/2
2005] Reparation Rights Tax Relief 43 
lack of importance, end the inconsistent tax treatment of these recoveries 
based on the distinction between physical and nonphysical injuries, stop 
the dual treatment of these recoveries as noneconomic damages under 
tort reform but as economic damages for tax purposes, and merge the 
interests of human rights’ and civil rights’ advocates and tort reformers.   
II.  DIGNITARY TORTS AND THE LEGISLATION AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
§§  61(A) AND 104(A)(2) 
A. The Meaning of Income is a Constitutional Concept, Not a Statutory 
Concept 
The Internal Revenue Code sets forth an expansive concept of gross 
income, which is subject to the limits of the U.S. Constitution.  As the 
House and Senate Reports state:  “Section 61(a) provides that gross 
income includes ‘all income from whatever source derived.’  This 
definition is based upon the 16th Amendment and the word ‘income’ is 
used in its constitutional sense.”5  
The definition of gross income has undergone very little legislative 
change from its inception to the present.  Originally, § 213(a) of 1918 and 
subsequently § 22(a) of 1939 provided that all gain, profits, and income 
derived from any source whatever are income subject to taxation.6  
Section 61 of 1954, now § 61(a) as promulgated in 1986, still provides that 
“gross income means all income from whatever source derived . . . .”7 
B. Until the 1996 Act, the Exclusion from Income Included Physical and 
Nonphysical Personal Injuries and Sickness, Such as Dignitary Torts 
The legislative history behind the exclusion from income statute, 
§ 104(a)(2), was silent as to whether personal injuries or sickness 
exempted physical and nonphysical personal injuries and sickness until 
                                                          
5 H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at A 18 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4155; S. REP. 
NO. 83-1622, at 168 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4802; see also Rutkin v. 
United States, 343 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1952) (stating that the full exercise by Congress of its 
income taxing power refers just to the Sixteenth Amendment); Merchants’ Loan & Trust 
Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519–20 (1921); James Edward Maule, Gross Income:  Overview 
and Conceptual Aspects, 501-2nd TAX MGM’T, A-1, A-4 (2002). 
6 Internal Revenue Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-1, § 22(a), 53 Stat. 9 (1939) (codified at 
I.R.C. § 22(a) (1939)); Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065 
(1919) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1918)). 
7 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 61(a), 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 2085 
(codified at I.R.C. § 61(a) (1986)); see also 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2002); Internal Revenue Code of 
1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 61, 68A Stat. 17 (1954) (codified at I.R.C. § 61 (1954)). 
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1996.8  In 1996, the legislative history discussed the explicit changes that 
were expected when nonphysical personal injuries and nonphysical 
sickness became taxable and when emotional distress was not 
considered a physical injury or physical sickness.9  
“Thus, the exclusion from gross income does not apply to any 
damages received (other than for medical expenses as discussed below) 
based on a claim of employment discrimination or injury to reputation 
accompanied by a claim of emotional distress.”10  The legislative history 
also broadly defined emotional distress to include symptoms, such as 
insomnia, headaches, and stomach disorders, that result from the 
emotional distress.11  
This bifurcation by Congress of personal injuries and sickness into 
physical and nonphysical injuries signifies a departure from almost 
eighty years of legislative, administrative, and judicial guidance.  On its 
surface, this departure might appear to conform to reparation rights tax 
relief,12 which generally originated from a physical loss.  However, on 
closer inspection in Parts III.A, III.B, and IV.D, the change that makes 
emotional distress recoveries subject to tax departs radically from the 
constitutional safeguards of dignitary torts, such as reparation rights and 
civil rights discrimination cases, which encompass emotional distress 
recoveries as reimbursement for infringement of civil or personal 
rights.13  
The pertinent exclusion from gross income underwent very little 
change from 1918–1996.  Section 213(b)(6) of 1918 and then § 22(b)(5) of 
1939 stated that gross income does not include “amounts received, through 
accident or health insurance or under workmen’s compensation acts, as 
compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any 
damages received whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or 
sickness.”14  From 1954 through mid-1996, § 104(a)(2) stated that gross 
                                                          
8 H.R. REP. NO. 767, at 9, 10, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 92 (1918). 
9 Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. 
§ 104(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996)); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-737, at 300–02 (1996), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1792–94. 
10 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-737, at 301 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1793. 
11 See id., reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1793  n.56. 
12 See infra text accompanying notes 20, 26. 
13 See infra text accompanying notes 20, 26. 
14 Internal Revenue Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-1, § 22(b)(5), 53 Stat. 10 (1939) (codified at 
I.R.C. § 22(b)(5) (1939)) (emphasis added); Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, 
§ 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 213(b)(6) (1918)). 
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income does not include “the amount of any damages received (whether by 
suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness.”15 
Then in 1996, Congress changed § 104(a)(2) to state that gross income 
does not include: 
“[T]he amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) 
received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump 
sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal physical 
injuries or physical sickness;” . . . “For purposes of paragraph 
(2), emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury 
or physical sickness. . . .” 16 
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF PERSONAL INJURY AND REPARATION 
RIGHTS RECOVERIES 
A. The Treasury Department Did Not Consider Physical or Nonphysical 
Personal Injury Recoveries To Be Income Under a Return of Human 
Capital Concept 
Originally, the Treasury Department taxed accident insurance 
proceeds and damage awards for pain and suffering as income from 
1915–1918.17  Then, the Attorney General issued an opinion regarding the 
phrase “gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever,” 
and concluded that accident insurance proceeds “merely take the place 
of capital in human ability which was destroyed by the accident . . . [and 
are] ‘capital’ as distinguished from ‘income’ receipts.”18  The Treasury 
Department followed this opinion by finding that accident insurance 
proceeds or amounts received for personal injuries in accidents were not 
income from 1918–1922.19  
Subsequently, a Solicitor’s opinion in 1922 held that nonphysical 
personal injury recoveries, such as the alienation of affection recoveries, 
                                                          
15 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 104(a)(2), 68A Stat. 30 (1954) 
(codified at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1954)) (emphasis added). 
16 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2002) (emphasis added); § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838. 
17 T.D. 2135, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 39, 42 (1915). The Treasury Department, Office of 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, ruled that money paid by an accident insurance policy 
on account of accidents was gross income.  It further ruled that damages received for pain 
and suffering were income.  As such, the damages would be taxable as “‘gains or profits 
and income derived from any source whatever.’”  See also T.D. 2690, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 
126 (1918) (promulgating Treas. Reg. § 33, revised, pt. I, at 130 (1918)). 
18 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304, 308 (1918). 
19 See generally T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918) (revoking Regulations No. 
33, revised, that were inconsistent with the 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304, 308 (1918)). 
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were not income.20  This opinion did not apply the exclusion from 
income, § 213(b)(6), the predecessor of § 104(a)(2),21 because “the 
question is really more fundamental, namely, whether such damages are 
within the legal definition of income.”22  
The author agrees with the 1922 Solicitor’s opinion and contends that 
logic requires that an item must first be income before it can become 
taxable income.  Thus, an item that is not income does not need to rely 
on an exclusion from income provision to avoid taxation.  Because a 
nonphysical personal injury recovery is not an income item, it also does 
not need to rely on an exclusion from income statute to avoid the tax on 
income.   
The Treasury Department again followed this 1922 Solicitor’s 
opinion by finding that nonphysical personal injury recoveries, being a 
loss of personal rights, were not income.23  Specifically, the Treasury 
Department stated that “a promise to marry is a personal right not 
susceptible of any appraisal in relation to market values and . . . damages 
. . . [for] the invasion of such right [do] not constitute taxable income.”24  
                                                          
20 See generally Sol. Op. 132-I-1 C.B. 92 (1922) (modifying Solicitor’s Memorandum 957 
and revoking Solicitor’s Memorandum 1384).  Upon the request of the Treasury, Congress 
enacted § 213(b)(6) as part of the Revenue Act of 1918, which excluded from gross income 
amounts received for personal injuries or sickness.  The legislative history was silent as to 
whether personal injuries or sickness exempted physical and nonphysical personal injuries 
and sickness.  H.R. REP. NO. 767, 65th Cong. 2d Sess. at 9–10, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 92 
(1918). This silence led to Solicitor’s Memorandum 1384, which decided that personal 
injuries meant physical injuries only.  Sol. Mem. 1384, 2 C.B. 71 (1920).  The Solicitor, using 
the § 213(b)(6) exclusion, then determined that the alienation of a wife’s affection was 
taxable.  Even though it was found to be a personal injury, it was not a physical injury, did 
not constitute capital, and was not due to sickness.  In 1922, the Solicitor was again 
confronted with the issue of whether alienation of affection, slander or libel of personal 
character, and surrender of custody of a minor child were excludable from income.  This 
opinion did not base its decision on the § 213(b)(6) exclusion from income, but focused on 
the meaning of income to find that these personal nonphysical injury claims are not 
income.  Id. 
21 See 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2002); § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838–39; § 104(a)(2), 68A Stat. 30; 
Internal Revenue Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-1, § 22(b)(5), 53 Stat. 10 (codified at I.R.C. 
§ 22(b)(5) (1939)); § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919). 
22 Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92, 93 (1922); see also Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) 
(holding that a pure stock dividend is not taxed because it is not income, and stating the 
legal definition of income as “gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both 
combined”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 906 (4th ed. 1968) (defining income); infra text 
accompanying note 88. 
23 I.T. 1804, II-2 C.B. 61, 62 (1923). 
24 Id.  The Treasury Department made this decision based upon Solicitor’s Opinion 132, 
supra note 20, and Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207 (stating that the legal definition of income is 
“gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined”). 
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The Treasury Department continued this same theme with reparation 
rights in 1928, finding that an award paid in accordance with the 
Settlement of War Claims Act for the loss of life “is not embraced in the 
general concept of the term ‘income.’”25  
B. The Treasury Department Finds that Personal Injury and Reparation 
Payments Are Not Income Because They Are a Reimbursement for the Loss 
of Civil or Personal Rights  
The Treasury Department revenue rulings from the 1950s through 
the early 1990s, as a general rule, continued to hold that personal injury 
payments and reparation payments were not income.26  The Treasury 
                                                          
25 I.T. 2420, VII-2 C.B. 123, 124 (1928). The Treasury Department referenced the § 213(a) 
definition of income that all gains, profits, and income derived from any source whatever 
are income subject to taxation.  However, this compensation was not income and thus not 
taxable because it restored the taxpayer to substantially the same financial and economic 
status as she possessed prior to the death of her husband.  Id. 
26 See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432–33 (1955) (holding punitive 
damages to be taxable gross income); Hawkins v. Comm’r, 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1025 (1928), acq., 
C.B. VII-1, 14 (finding that compensatory damages for injury to personal reputation were 
not income).  See generally Rev. Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 C.B. 179 (holding that compensation for 
the loss of life under a state wrongful death statute is not embraced in the general concept 
of the term income, and citing I.T. 2420, supra note 25, and § 22(a) (successor to § 213(a) 
used in I.T. 2420)).  Both sections provided that all gains, profits, and income derived from 
any source whatever are income subject to taxation.  Id.  See also generally Rev. Rul. 85-98, 
1985-2 C.B. 51 (superseding Rev. Rul. 58-418, reaffirming that libel recoveries for injury to 
personal reputation are excludable, citing § 61, but using the § 104(a)(2) exclusion from 
gross income and finding punitive damages to be includible in gross income); Rev. Rul. 74-
205, 1974-1 C.B. 21 (extending Rev. Rul. 63-136, Rev. Rul. 68-38, and Rev. Rul. 72-340 to 
replacement housing payments made under legislatively provided social benefit programs 
for promotion of the general welfare); Rev. Rul. 74-77, 1974-1 C.B. 33 (superseding Sol. Op. 
132, reaffirming that damages for alienation of affections and for surrender of the custody 
of minor child are not income because they relate to personal or family rights, not property 
rights, and citing § 61, but obsoleted by Rev. Rul. 98-37 due to the 1996 Act amending 
§ 104(a)(2)); Rev. Rul. 72-340, 1972-2 C.B. 31 (extending Rev. Rul. 63-136 for stipends paid to 
probationers to aid in acquiring training); Rev. Rul. 69-212, 1969-1 C.B. 34 (extending Rev. 
Rul. 58-370 to a widow’s pension); Rev. Rul. 68-38, 1968-1 C.B. 446 (extending Rev. Rul. 63-
136 to a training program on an Indian reservation); Rev. Rul. 63-136, 1963-2 C.B. 19 
(finding that benefit payments for training are not includible in gross income because they 
are similar to other unemployment relief payments made for the promotion of the general 
welfare, citing § 61, I.T. 3230, 1938-2 C.B. 136; Rev. Rul. 55-562, 1955-2 C.B. 21; and Rev. Rul. 
57-102, 1957-1 C.B. 26); Rev. Rul. 58-500, 1958-2 C.B. 21 (extending Rev. Rul. 56-518 as 
clarified by Rev. Rul. 57-505); Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18 (holding that compensatory 
damages for libel and slander resulting in injury to personal reputation are excludable from 
gross income, citing § 61); Rev. Rul. 58-370, 1958-2 C.B. 14 (extending Rev. Rul. 56-518 and 
Rev. Rul. 57-505 for Nazi persecution, and restating that these payments are in the nature 
of reimbursement for deprivation of civil or personal rights, citing § 61); Rev. Rul. 56-518, 
1956-2 C.B. 25 (clarified by Rev. Rul. 57-505, 1957-2 C.B. 50) (extending Rev. Rul. 55-132 to 
U.S. citizens or residents for Nazi persecution, citing § 61, the successor to § 22(a), and 
providing that “gross income means all income from whatever source derived . . . .”)); Rev. 
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Department based these rulings on the definition of gross income 
§§ 213(a), 22(a), 61, and 61(a), which define gross income.  It did not base 
the rulings on §§ 213(b)(6), 22(b)(5), and 104(a)(2), which set forth 
exclusions from income.  Due to this, the Treasury Department found 
that such payments are a reimbursement for the loss of civil or personal 
rights and thus did not meet the definition of income.27  The author 
asserts, as stated in Part II.A, that if these payments are not income, they 
do not need exclusion from income statutes to avoid becoming taxable 
income.  
For example, payments received by an American Prisoner of War 
were not includible in gross income, as they were merely reimbursement 
for the loss of personal rights.28  Similarly, payments received for Nazi 
persecution were not includible in income, as they constituted 
reimbursement for the loss of personal rights or civil rights.29 
These rulings used the definition of income under Hawkins v. 
Commissioner30 and the currently accepted, redefined, and broader 
definition of income of the U.S. Supreme Court under Commissioner v. 
Glenshaw Glass Co.,31 which referred to increases to wealth.32  Even using 
the most expansive definition of income, these rulings concluded that 
recoveries for all nonphysical injuries should not be items of income, 
thus negating the need to be excluded from income.33   
C. Under the “In Lieu Of” Test, Payments Substituting for Actual Earnings 
are Income but Payments Substituting for Personal Assets Are Not Income 
In 1972, the IRS found a Title VII discrimination claim to be income 
under § 61 because the amount paid was actual earnings.34  This ruling 
                                                                                                                                  
Rul. 56-462, 1956-2 C.B. 20 (extending Rev. Rul. 54-19 to payments to Korean War 
prisoners); Rev. Rul. 55-132, 1955-1 C.B. 213 (holding that amounts received by an 
American Prisoner of War are in the nature of reimbursement for the loss of personal rights 
and are not includible in gross income, citing again to § 22(a)). 
27 See supra note 26. 
28 Rev. Rul. 55-132, 1955-1 C.B. 213; see also supra text accompanying note 26. 
29 Rev. Rul. 58-370, 1958-2 C.B. 14; see also supra text accompanying note 26. 
30 6 B.T.A. at 1023 (finding that personal reputation damages are compensatory and thus 
not income). 
31 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (stating that exemplary damages are income and defining 
income as “undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized”). 
32 Id. 
33 See supra notes 20, 26 and accompanying text. 
34 See generally Rev. Rul. 72-341, 1972-2 C.B. 32 (amplified by Rev. Rul. 84-92, 1984-1 C.B. 
204 to include compensation for the Railroad Retirement Tax Act and holding that 
payments to employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for lost earnings 
were gross income under § 61). 
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relied on the “in lieu of” test, discussed in the U.S. Supreme Court case 
of Hort v. Commissioner,35 which looked to the nature of the item for 
which the damages were a substitute.36  Conversely, under the “in lieu 
of” test, also discussed in the U.S. Supreme Court case O’Gilvie v. United 
States,37 emotional distress recoveries are not income because the 
government does not tax the reimbursement of something that would 
not otherwise be taxed.38  
D. Taxpayers Used the Exclusion From Income Statute, Not the Definition of 
Income Statute, in Support of Their Cases 
Taxpayers used the exclusion from income §§ 22(b)(5) and 104(a)(2) 
in their cases rather than showing that their recoveries were not income 
under § 61(a), the definition of income.39  These taxpayers used the 
exclusion from income provision at first because the exclusion from 
income statute granted them specific relief from taxation, or, as seen 
below, because their recoveries were items of income that needed a 
specific exclusion from income statute to avoid taxation.  Due to this, the 
                                                          
35 313 U.S. 28 (1941). 
36 Id. at 32 (using the “in lieu of” test to find income because the cancellation of a lease 
was essentially a substitute for rental payments). 
37 519 U.S. 79 (1996). 
38 Id. at 86 (finding that punitive damages were not excludable from income).  The Court 
in O’Gilvie reviewed the history of the personal injury exclusion as based on a decision not 
to tax “damages that, making up for a loss, seek to make a victim whole . . . .”  Id.; see also 
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 432 n.8 (“The long history of departmental rulings holding 
personal injury recoveries nontaxable [is based] on the theory that they roughly correspond 
to a return of capital . . . .”). 
39 See also Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55 (not following Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F. 2d 
693 (9th Cir. 1983), rev’g Roemer v. Comm’r, 79 T.C. 398 (1982) (excluding libel suit 
recoveries under § 104(a)(2) as personal, and finding that a predominantly business and 
professional libel suit recovery is not excluded from gross income under § 104(a)(2)); Rev. 
Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32 (revoking Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47 and finding that 
wrongful death statutes where only punitive damages are recoverable are includible in 
gross income, but if the state’s statute provides that no punitive damages are recoverable, 
then recovery is excludable from gross income under the exclusion from income 
§ 104(a)(2)); supra text accompanying note 26.  See generally Rev. Rul. 85-98, 1985-2 C.B. 51; 
Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50 (amplifying Rev. Rul. 61-1 and stating that lost wages paid 
as damages for a personal injury sustained in an accident are excludable from gross income 
under § 104(a)(2)); Rev. Rul. 61-1, 1961-1 C.B. 14 (holding that a railroad employee’s 
settlement for personal injuries is not includible in gross income, even for the amount 
apportioned to time lost under the exclusion from income § 104(a)(2)); Rev. Rul. 103, 1953-1 
C.B. 20 (advising that employer disability payments that are not a health or accident 
insurance plan in excess of workmen’s compensation are includible in gross income, unless 
made by the employer for personal injuries or sickness in satisfaction of a tort or tort-type 
liability, under the exclusion from income § 22(b)). 
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Treasury Department and courts began basing their decisions and 
rulings on the statutory interpretation of this exclusion.40  
The U.S. Supreme Court cases of United States v. Burke41 and 
Commissioner v. Schleier42 arose from discrimination statutes that allowed 
remedies for back pay or liquidated damage recoveries but provided no 
relief for emotional distress recoveries.43  In both cases, the parties based 
their arguments on the exclusion from income statute, § 104(a)(2).44  In 
each of these cases, the taxpayers conceded that their discrimination case 
recoveries for back pay or liquidated damages were income items.45  This 
appears to be a logical concession because these payments substituted 
for actual earnings or were considered windfalls under the “in lieu of” 
test, analyzed under Part III.C. 
The Burke decision in 1992 discussed in dictum the tort-like nature of 
the remedies provided under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which also 
allowed compensatory damages for emotional distress and punitive 
damages in marked contrast to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
allowed only back pay damages.46  Following this dictum, in 1993 the 
IRS held that compensatory damages, including back pay for claims of 
disparate employment discrimination, were excluded from gross income 
as tort-like damages for personal injury under § 104(a)(2).47  Then, the 
Schleier decision in 1995 found no exclusion from tax for an age 
discrimination case’s limited remedies of back pay and liquidated 
damages.  Based on this decision, the IRS suspended their 1993 ruling to 
invite public comment.48  
In 1996, the IRS ultimately abrogated their 1993 discrimination 
ruling49 in light of § 104(a)(2), as amended by § 1605 of the 1996 Act.50  
The IRS acknowledged that the amended § 104(a)(2) restricted the 
exclusion from gross income to physical personal injuries or sickness and 
                                                          
40 See Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 234 
(1992); Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-2 C.B. 6; Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61; Notice 95-45, 1995-2 
C.B. 330. 
41 504 U.S. 229 (1992). 
42 515 U.S. 323 (1995). 
43 Schleier, 515 U.S. at 323; Burke, 504 U.S. at 229. 
44 Schleier, 515 U.S. at 323; Burke, 504 U.S. at 229. 
45 See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 328; Burke, 504 U.S. at 233. 
46 Burke, 504 U.S. at 241. 
47 Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61. 
48 Schleier, 515 U.S. at 323; see also Notice 95-45, 1995-2 C.B. 330. 
49 Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-2 C.B. 6. 
50 26 U.S.C. § 104 (a)(2) (2002). 
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provided that emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury 
or physical sickness.51  
This 1996 ruling decided that back pay was not excluded from gross 
income as disparate treatment employment discrimination under the 
former § 104(a)(2) because it was not received due to personal injuries or 
sickness.52  However, prior to the 1996 Act, the IRS still found that 
emotional distress recoveries were excluded when received on account 
of personal injuries or sickness under the former § 104(a)(2), Burke, and 
Schleier.53  
The distinction made by the IRS between back pay and emotional 
distress recoveries displays the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation in 
both Burke and Schleier:  Recoveries for emotional distress qualify for the 
former § 104(a)(2) exclusion from income because when viewed in 
isolation, they stem from a tort-type right and result from a personal 
injury.54  This distinction also highlights the constitutional aspect of 
emotional distress recoveries as not being income, which Part IV below 
discusses further. 
E. Reparation Rights Tax Relief Should Guide Congress Back to Civil Rights 
Tax Relief 
Reparation rights and discrimination cases have both a human rights 
and a civil rights component.  Human rights embody the freedoms and 
benefits all human beings should be able to claim as a matter of right in 
their society at an international level.55  Civil rights entail the rights of 
personal liberty guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution as well as U.S. 
legislation.56   
Thus, violations of the U.S. discrimination statutes cause a violation 
of both human rights and civil rights.  These human rights and civil 
                                                          
51 Id. 
52 Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-2 C.B. 6. 
53 Id.; see also Schleier, 515 U.S. at 332; Burke, 505 U.S. at 241; Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 
61; Douglas A. Kahn, Taxation of Damages After Schleier—Where are We and Where Do We Go 
From Here?, 15 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 305, 330 (1995) (“If the ADEA had allowed damages to 
be awarded for pain and suffering, and if that added item were deemed sufficient to make 
a claim under the ADEA a tort or tort-type claim, then damages received by the taxpayer 
for pain and suffering would be received on account of a personal injury, and so would be 
excluded from income.”)  (citation omitted). 
54 See supra note 53. 
55 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 758 (8th ed. 2004) (defining human rights). 
56 Id. at 263 (8th ed. 2004) (defining civil rights). 
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rights violations cross more than one generation because they stem from 
social upheaval and longterm suffering.57   
The 1996 Act’s statutory shift limits the exclusion from tax to 
physical personal injury and sickness, thereby taxing nonphysical 
personal injury and sickness, which includes emotional distress 
recoveries in discrimination cases.  This shift represents a narrowing of 
our legislature’s former humanitarianism policy.58  In contrast, instances 
of America’s reparation tax relief for POWs,59 the Holocaust,60 9-11 
victims,61 and the proposed African-American reparation legislation for 
                                                          
57 Mark J. Wolff, Sex, Race, and Age:  Double Discrimination in Torts and Taxes, 78 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1341, 1344 (2000).  Mr. Wolff stated: 
[T]oday physicians, lawyers, and social scientists acknowledge that 
nonphysical injuries resulting from racial discrimination cause 
enduring intergenerational scars and may be more enduring and more 
severe than physical injuries caused by the loss of an arm or leg in a 
traffic accident.  Additionally, both empirical studies and 
congressional policies now recognize the insidiousness of sexual 
harassment, age, and disability discrimination, as well as the long-term 
and sometimes permanently debilitating effects inflicted upon their 
victims. 
Id. (citation omitted); see also Karen B. Brown, Not Color-Or-Gender-Neutral:  New Tax 
Treatment of Employment Discrimination Damages, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 223, 
231 (1998) (“The result is codification of the notion that an injury to the physical part of an 
individual is real and tangible and, hence, legally perceptible. . . .  Harm to an individual in 
the form of employment discrimination is not cognizable because it is not real (imaginary, 
not traceable to a cause), and it is intangible (incapable of measurement).”); Kahn, supra 
note 53, at 318.  Mr. Kahn surmised: 
On the other hand, the case for excluding damages received for 
nonphysical injuries (other perhaps than for mental damage) is less 
compelling.  The plight of a person who suffers exclusively 
nonphysical injuries does not arouse the same degree of sympathy that 
attaches to a victim who suffers a serious physical injury. 
Id.; Harold S. Peckron, Reparation Payments—An Exclusion Revisited, 34 U.S.F.L. REV. 705 
(2000). 
58 Wolff, supra note 57, at 1401; see also Kahn, supra note 53, at 316. 
59 See supra text accompanying note 26. 
60 Id.; see also Holocaust Restitution Tax Fairness Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-358, § 2, 116 
Stat. 3015 (2002) (repealing the sunset of section 901); Peckron, supra note 57 at 705.  See 
generally Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 
§ 803, 115 Stat. 149 (2001) (excluding from federal income tax restitution received by 
victims of Nazi regime). 
61 See 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(5) (2002); see also John M. Barkett, Combating Terrorism in the 
Environmental Trenches:  Terrorism and the Future of Torts; If Terror Reigns, Will Torts Follow?, 
9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 485, 543 (2003); Hillel Sommer, Providing Compensation for Harm 
Caused by Terrorism:  Lessons Learned in the Israeli Experience, 36 IND. L. REV. 335, 365 (2003).  
See generally Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, §§ 101-116, 
115 Stat. 2427  (2002) (providing income tax and estate tax relief to 9-11 victims and anthrax 
victims); Elbert Lin, Case Comment, Korematsu Continued . . . , 112 YALE L.J. 1911, 1913 
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slavery62 demand that Congress reinstate tax relief for civil rights cases 
to reinforce America’s human rights resolve.  
Tax doctrine indicates that reparations in the form of recoveries for 
the taking of human rights or civil rights are not income because they are 
a reimbursement for the loss of personal or civil rights.63  Using this tax 
doctrine, recoveries for the taking of human rights in reparation cases 
and personal or civil rights in personal injury and discrimination cases 
are not income.64 
IV.  THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF TAXING EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
RECOVERIES 
A. The Tax History of the U.S. Constitution   
The focus of America’s revolution and the break with Britain was 
taxation, as shown in the well-known phrase allowing no taxation 
without representation.65  America’s first constitution, the Articles of 
Confederation, failed to provide enforcement powers for the national 
                                                                                                                                  
(2003) (comparing Pearl Harbor with 9-11 as signifying losses of personal rights by using 
“threats to national security to deflect attention from race-based actions”). 
62 See also Tuneen E. Chisolm, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door:  Examining the 
Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 677, 727 n.56 (1999) 
(citing Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African Americans Act, H.R. 40, 
105th Cong., § 2(b) (1997), which “propos[ed] to establish a commission to examine the 
institution of slavery . . . and the impact of these experiences on living African 
Americans . . . ”); Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. Our Debts?  Righting the Wrongs of Slavery, 89 
GEO. L.J. 2531 (2001); Van B. Luong, Recent Development:  Political Interest Convergence:  
African American Reparations and the Image of American Democracy, 25 HAW. L. REV. 253, 258 
(2002); Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations:  Japanese American Redress and African American 
Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 477, 523 n.36 (1998) (referring to a section of the article “describing 
the reframing of reparations from compensation to ‘repair’—that is, the repairing of tears in 
the structural and psychological fabric of a society resulting from the social and economic 
subordination of some of its members”).  See generally African American Reparations 
Commission Act, H.R. 40, 105th Cong. (1997) (sponsored by Rep. John Conyers from 1989 
forward). 
63 See supra Part III.B. 
64 See supra Part III.B. 
65 See JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS § 327.7 (16th ed., 1992) (noting the phrase 
“taxation without representation is tyranny” was attributed to James Otis in 1763); Bruce 
Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1999) (“During the 
revolutionary era, taxation was at the very center of popular consciousness.  The break 
with Britain was motivated largely by this issue . . . .”). 
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government to raise revenue from the states.66  The Federalists’ solution 
was the broad grant of power to Congress to impose and collect taxes.67  
Thus, the U.S. Constitution gave Congress broad powers of taxation, 
but this power was subject to an important income taxation limit.  This 
constitutional limit directed that no capitation or other direct tax shall be 
imposed, unless in proportion to the census or apportioned among the 
several states.68  
Three reasons have been proposed for this limitation.  First, there 
was a desire to limit the national government’s taxation powers to 
protect private rights from oppressive taxation.69  Second, it was 
important to protect state and local governments’ rights to raise revenues 
through direct taxes, like real estate taxes.70  Third, the limitation arose 
from the Great Compromise, which Benjamin Franklin proposed.  The 
compromise espoused equal representation in the Senate and 
proportional representation in the House.71  Acceptance of this 
compromise led to the South’s insistence on counting their slaves as 
three-fifths of a person in order to obtain greater representation in the 
House in exchange for paying an extra three-fifths share of direct taxes.72  
                                                          
66 See Ackerman, supra note 65, at 6. 
67 See Ackerman, supra note 65, at 5.  The general taxing power and the uniformity rule 
provides:  “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and 
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the 
United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises, shall be uniform throughout the United 
States.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
68 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. 
XVI.  The direct tax clauses provide: 
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to 
the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken. . . .  The 
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from 
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several 
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration. . . .  
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the 
several States which may be included within this Union, according to 
their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the 
whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to service for a 
Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other 
Persons. 
Id. 
69 See F. Patrick Hubbard, Making People Whole Again:  The Constitutionality of Taxing 
Compensatory Tort Damages For Mental Distress, 49 FLA. L. REV. 725, 729 (1997). 
70 See id. at 730. 
71 See Ackerman, supra note 65, at 8. 
72 Id. 
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If the Great Compromise to slavery were the only reason for this 
limit, as some commentators contend, then a narrow reading of the 
direct tax clause as applying only to real estate or poll taxes may be 
warranted.73  However, if the concerns about oppressive taxation and 
protecting the state and local governments’ rights to raise revenue 
through direct taxes were also considerations that resulted in the 
limitation, then prohibition against all capitation and direct taxes is still 
important today.74  
Frederick Douglass stated his view that all the reasons were relevant:   
I hold that the Federal Government was never, in its 
essence, anything but an anti-slavery government. 
Abolish slavery tomorrow, and not a sentence or syllable 
of the Constitution need be altered.  It was purposely 
framed as to give no claim, no sanction to the claim, of 
property in man.  If in its origin slavery had any relation 
to the government, it was only as the scaffolding to the 
magnificent structure, to be removed as soon as the 
building was completed.75  
B. An Emotional Distress Recovery Tax Under the 1996 Act Is a Direct 
Tax/Capitation Tax 
Even those commentators who would view the direct tax 
apportionment clause narrowly still concede that a capitation type of tax 
is of equal vitality today.76  A capitation tax has been defined as a direct 
tax, which is based on the simple fact of a person’s existence.77  
                                                          
73 See id. at 53, 56; Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes:  The Foul-Up In the 
Core of the Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 71, 72 (1998). 
74 See Hubbard, supra note 69, at 730. 
75 Frederick Douglass, Address for the Promotion of Colored Enlistments (July 6, 1983), in 
THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 365 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1950); see also Erik 
M. Jensen, Taxation and the Constitution:  How to Read the Direct Tax Clauses, 15 J.L. & POL. 
687, 706, 714 n.75 (1999); c.f. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE:  ITS 
SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 27 (Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (“[I]t is as 
though the framers were half-consciously trying to frame two constitutions, one for their 
own time and the other for the ages, with slavery viewed bifocally—that is, plainly visible 
at their feet, but disappearing when they lifted their eyes.”). 
76 See Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 345 (1945) (holding that Congress may tax real 
estate or chattels only if the tax is apportioned); see also Ackerman, supra note 65, at 58; 
Johnson, supra note 73, at 71, 80. 
77 See Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 433, 444 (1868); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (involving a libel action and stating that “actual injury . . . 
[includes] . . . mental anguish and suffering”); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 281 (1937), 
overruled on another point by Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); 
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Therefore, it is a direct tax imposed on a person, as a person, rather than 
imposed on an activity or on real or personal property.78  
C. The 1996 Act Failed To Apportion the Emotional Distress Recovery Tax 
Under the mechanics of apportionment, State X, which has twice the 
population of State Y, would have twice the aggregate liability of State Y.  
If an emotional distress recovery tax is apportioned and State X’s per 
capita emotional distress awards are only one-half of State Y’s, then the 
tax rates on the emotional distress awards in State X would have to be 
twice those in State Y to satisfy the apportionment requirement.79  Thus, 
emotional distress awards are not apportioned under the 1996 exclusion 
from income statute, § 104(a)(2), because such a formula of 
apportionment was not included in the 1996 exclusion of income statute. 
                                                                                                                                  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 264 (8th ed. 2004) (defining poll-tax and capitation tax); BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 563 (8th ed. 2004) (providing that  emotional distress is another term for 
the lack of psychic well-being that can also be called numerous names, such as mental 
distress, mental anguish, mental suffering, pain and suffering, or a myriad of other 
intangible harms); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 737 (8th ed. 2004) (defining health as the 
freedom from pain or sickness and the state of being sound or whole in body, mind, or 
soul, and the right to the enjoyment of health as a subdivision of the right of personal 
security, which is one of the absolute rights of persons); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1347–48 
(8th ed. 2004) (defining personal rights as encompassing the rights of personal security, one 
of which is health); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 852 (4th ed. 1968); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1137 (4th ed. 1968) (defining the legal meaning of mental as relating to or existing in the 
mind; intellectual, emotional, or psychic, as distinguished from bodily or physical); 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1320 (4th ed. 1968); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1488 (4th ed. 
1968); Frank J. Doti, Personal Injury Tax Exclusion:  An Analysis and Update, 75 DENV. U.L. 
REV. 61, 63 (1997) (“From its inception, in my opinion, the exclusion for personal injury 
awards should have been limited to losses of human capital.  By this I mean any losses to a 
person’s birthright—an uninjured body and mind.”); Hubbard, supra note 69, at 760 
(stating that “[t]axing each human for the benefits of [or the compensation from not] 
possessing and enjoying emotional well-being would be effectively a poll tax [or capitation 
tax] because it would be laid upon persons without regard to their occupations or 
property,” and emphasizing that psychic well-being is based on the simple fact of a 
person’s existence, i.e., their uniquely human mental aspect and is a basic, natural, and 
personal right); Nicholas M. Whittington, Against the Grain:  An Interdisciplinary Examination 
of the 1996 Federal Statutory Changes to the Taxability of Personal Injury Awards, 37 WASHBURN 
L.J. 153 (1997); Sharon E. Stedman, Note, Congress’s Amendment to Section 104 of the Tax Code 
Will Not Clarify the Tax Treatment of Damages and Will Lead to Arbitrary Distinctions, 21 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 387, 389 (1997). 
78 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.  But see also infra Part IV.E. 
79 Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of 
“Incomes”, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1067 (2001). 
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D. The 1996 Act’s Taxation of Emotional Distress Recoveries as Income Is 
Unconstitutional 
To categorize emotional distress recoveries as taxable income, these 
recoveries must first be considered income.  However, emotional distress 
recoveries do not fall within the U.S. Supreme Court’s concept that 
income 80 is comprised of undeniable accessions to wealth.81  They also 
do not fall within the Internal Revenue Code’s concept of gross income 
under § 61(a),82 as all income from whatever source derived.83  
The Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution allows Congress 
“to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, 
without apportionment . . . .”84  This amendment only applies to items of 
income.85  Thus, the Sixteenth Amendment does not apply to the taxation 
of recoveries meant to compensate a person for emotional distress.  
Without the protection of the Sixteenth Amendment, the taxation of 
emotional distress recoveries is a capitation or direct tax86 done without 
apportionment upon the person who suffers emotional distress, which 
violates Article I, section 9 of the U.S. Constitution.87   
Income refers to gains or profits, which are true increases in the 
amount of wealth.88  To restore the person to the condition in which the 
person originally existed89 is not an enrichment that constitutes wealth.  
For example, a recovery to compensate a person for emotional distress 
does not increase the person’s wealth, but merely restores that person to 
his or her previous condition. 
As the U.S. Supreme Court recently explained in O’Gilvie,90 tax 
policy excludes damages that substitute for “personal assets that the 
                                                          
80 Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). 
81 See id. 
82 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2002). 
83 Id. 
84 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
85 Id.; see also Hubbard, supra note 69, at 732 (stating that the Sixteenth Amendment 
“does not eliminate the apportionment requirement for direct taxes that do not involve 
income”). 
86 Hubbard, supra note 69, at 760. 
87 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; see also U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
88 Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 431; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 778 (8th ed. 2004) 
(defining income); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 906 (4th ed. 1968) (defining income). 
89 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418–19 (1975) (involving a Title VII 
race discrimination claim and stating the make whole concept). 
90 O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 86 (1996); see also Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 
432 n.8. 
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government does not tax and would not have taxed had the victim not 
lost them.”91  If the government does not tax the joy of life, then 
recoveries for the lost joy of life should not be taxed.92  Thus, the current 
taxing of emotional distress recoveries under § 104(a)(2) has now 
unconstitutionally decreed that:  “If you hurt and cry, I’ll tax your 
tears.”93 
E. An Emotional Distress Recovery Is Not an Income Item in the Statutory 
Sense 
An emotional distress recovery, if taxed, is best viewed as a 
capitation tax on the person.94  Even if an emotional distress recovery tax 
is considered a tax on personal property95 or a tax on an activity,96 an 
                                                          
91 O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 86. 
92 See F. Phillip Manns, Jr., Restoring Tortiously Damaged Human Capital Tax-Free Under 
Internal Revenue Code Section 104(a)(2)’s New Physical Injury Requirement, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 
347, 349–50 (1998) (“Damage payments are treated identically with the thing for which they 
substitute . . . .  Similarly, other aspects of living, like the joy of life, are not taxed.  
Therefore, damages for lost joy of life should not be taxed either.”).  See infra notes 95–101 
for a discussion of Mr. Manns’ premise that recoveries from nontaxable items are converted 
into taxable items without the exclusion from income statute. 
93 Hubbard, supra note 69, at 726. 
94 See supra Part IV.B. 
95 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1382 (4th ed. 1968); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1254 (8th ed. 2004) (stating that personal property in its broad and general sense is any 
movable or intangible thing that is the subject of ownership not in the realm of real estate, 
such as a right or interest in things personal); Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 
CORNELL L. REV. 143 (1992) (arguing that an emotional distress damage award can be 
considered a monetary recovery that creates an economic dimension within a noneconomic 
harm by virtue of being granted monetary recoveries for those noneconomic harms).  Mr. 
Dodge’s article was written before Mr. Hubbard’s article discussing the constitutional 
restraints of taxing emotional distress.  Mr. Dodge recognizes the “in lieu of” test discussed 
in the Supreme Court’s concurring decision in United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 311 
(1960), which states:  “The principle at work here is that payment which compensates for a 
loss of something which would not itself have been an item of gross income is not a taxable 
payment.”  However, Mr. Dodge counters that test because the tax base must look to the 
changes in objective net wealth and be equated with material resources, like money and 
property, which can be used by the government.  Mr. Dodge has a logical extrapolation to 
the argument that if you cry, I will not tax your tears, by including it, but if you receive 
money for those tears, then I will tax the money.  However, this extension still violates the 
court’s tax policy under Kaiser.  This extension also does not take into account the duality of 
individuals as espoused in United States v. Gilmore, which recognizes that an individual has 
two personalities:  “[O]ne is [as] a seeker after profit who can deduct the expenses incurred 
in that search; the other is [as] a creature satisfying his needs as a human and those of his 
family but who cannot deduct such consumption and related expenditures.”  372 U.S. 39, 
44 (1963) (quoting SURREY & WARREN, CASES ON FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 272 (1960)).  
Further, it violates constitutional policy, as demonstrated in Parts IV.A–D, which limits the 
tax base and what you can tax without apportionment. 
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emotional distress recovery tax is not a tax on the income from a person, 
property, or an activity, because it does not stem from income in the 
statutory sense.97  
Recovery for emotional distress does not constitute income in the 
general statutory sense, as all income from whatever source derived.98  
                                                                                                                                  
96 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 36, 292, 855 (8th ed. 2004) (“Activity, Common or Joint 
Enterprise:  An activity is the collective acts of one person or of two or more people in a 
common or joint enterprise, which may be defined as a non-commercial joint venture”); see 
also Douglas A. Kahn, The Constitutionality of Taxing Compensatory Damages for Mental 
Distress When There Was No Accompanying Physical Injury, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 128, 129 (1999) 
(stating that emotional distress damage awards are income, even if emotional distress itself 
is not). Mr. Kahn depicts the litigation or settlement aspect leading to an award as 
transforming noneconomic harms into an economic or commercial environment.  Mr. Kahn 
rebuts the unconstitutionality of taxing mental distress by questioning any reliance on the 
Pollack or Macomber cases or the return of human capital or noncommercial nature theories, 
taking the stance that taxing mental distress recoveries is constitutional.  While this Article 
acknowledges that the dictionary definition of income in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 
207 (1920), has been expanded under Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), to include an 
economic definition as well, this author uses the Glenshaw Glass Co. and post-Glenshaw Glass 
Co. cases’ definition of income and emotional distress to contend that emotional distress 
recoveries are not an undeniable accession to wealth.  Further, this author uses a narrow 
interpretation of Pollock, collectively Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) 
(“Pollock I”) and Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (“Pollock II”).  A 
narrow reading of both Pollock decisions is that the 1894 tax, which the Supreme Court 
declared unconstitutional, was primarily a tax on income from property, and these two 
decisions addressed personal property taxes and real estate taxes as direct taxes requiring 
apportionment.  The Court also held that if a tax on real estate or personal property is a 
direct tax, then it follows that a tax on the income from real estate or invested personal 
property is a direct tax.  Pollack I, 157 U.S. at 579–83; Pollack II, 158 U.S. at 628, 634.  In 
reaffirming the Pollock decisions, as modified by Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 
24–25 (1916), which upheld the progressive income tax passed just after the passage of the 
Sixteenth Amendment, this Court said:  “Congress may tax real estate or chattels if the tax 
is apportioned, and without apportionment it may tax an excise upon a particular use or 
enjoyment of property or the shifting from one to another of any power or privilege 
incidental to the ownership or enjoyment of property.”  Chief Justice Edward White, one of 
the four dissenters in the Pollock decisions, wrote the unanimous opinion in Brushaber that 
determined that the Sixteenth Amendment only overruled the Pollock decisions’ effort to 
trace income back to its underlying asset, and he implied that the Sixteenth Amendment 
approved of the Pollock decisions’ expansionary reading of the direct tax clauses to include 
capitation taxes and taxes on real estate and personal property, but not to include the 
income from real estate or personal property.  Finally, this author uses not only a return of 
human capital or the noncommercial nature theories, but also utilizes the reparation rights 
tax relief analogy that finds a reimbursement for civil or personal rights not to be income.  
Thus, an emotional distress recovery is also not income as a reimbursement for a personal 
or civil right, which Mr. Kahn did not address.  This author further concludes that 
intangible harms from all nonphysical injuries recoveries should not be items of income, 
thus negating the need to be excluded from income. 
97 See § 61(a), 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 2085; Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. 
No. 83-591, § 61, 68A Stat. 17 (1954) (codified at I.R.C. § 61 (1954)); see also 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) 
(2002). 
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Also, an emotional distress recovery does not fit into the statutory gross 
income subsections under compensation for services, including fees, 
commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items;99 gross income derived 
from business;100 or gains derived from dealings in property.101  Rather, 
an emotional distress recovery falls under such tax doctrines as a return 
of human capital, a reimbursement for the loss of personal or civil rights, 
the “in lieu of” test, or horizontal equity.102  
                                                                                                                                  
98 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
99 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(1) (2002); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 301 (8th ed. 2004) 
(defining compensation to include payment of damages to make the person whole).  But see 
also Kaiser, 363 U.S. at 310 (“Payment . . . as compensation for a loss or injury that had been 
suffered . . . [is] not taxable either because not greater in amount than the loss or because 
the thing lost or damaged had no ascertainable market value and so it could not be said 
that there had been any net profit to the taxpayer through the effectual exchange of the 
thing lost for the payment received.”); supra Part III.C (explaining that compensation in the 
form of damages has been limited in case law by the “in lieu of” test). 
100 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(2) (2002); see O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 86 (1996) 
(emphasizing that no gain has been received when “damages that, making up for a loss, 
seek to make a victim whole, or, speaking very loosely, ‘return the victim’s personal with 
financial capital’”); Hubbard, supra note 69, at 763–64 (arguing that emotions do not have 
an economic dimension because happiness or sorrow cannot be bought and sold); see also 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 211 (8th ed. 2004) (defining business as a commercial enterprise 
carried on for profit, a particular occupation or employment habitually engaged in for 
livelihood or gain, commercial transactions, or by extension of a noncommercial nature, 
such as the court’s business or parliamentary business).  But see also BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 778 (8th ed. 2004) (defining income); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 906 (4th ed. 
1968); supra note 84 (explaining that business, as used in a noncommercial sense, negates 
the concept of income as one of gain, earnings, or profit). 
101 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(3) (2002); see also supra text accompanying note 96.  Logically, there 
can be no gain when the measure of damages is the amount of money necessary to make 
the victim whole again.  This is especially true when recoveries for emotional distress 
damages are not rendered in lieu of something that is otherwise taxable because emotional 
well-being, the lack of emotional distress, is not taxable as income.  Hubbard, supra note 69, 
at 761. 
102 See Part III.A–C, IV.F; see also O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 84 (“At that time, this Court had 
recently decided several cases based on the principle that a restoration of capital was not 
income; hence it fell outside the definition of ‘income’ upon which the law imposed a 
tax.”); Doti, supra note 77, at 62 ( “Congress should have eliminated the section 104(a)(2) 
exclusion for lost wages and earning power in all cases . . . .  Uncertainty and resulting 
litigation will continue until Congress limits the exclusion to damages attributable solely to 
losses of human capital.”).  Gain or income is defined broadly to be an increase in wealth, 
clearly realized, over which the taxpayer has control, but a recovery that just repairs or 
reimburses for the loss suffered and merely substitutes for goods of a nontaxable nature, 
such as pleasure or pain, is not gain or income.  See also Hubbard, supra note 69, at 760 
(“Even if it were proper to treat payments of compensatory awards as taxable transactions, 
there would be serious equal treatment problems with an excise imposed only on awards 
for mental distress unaccompanied by a physical injury and imposed at a rate which varies 
with the taxpayer’s overall income.”); Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen, Discrimination Against 
Damages for Unlawful Discrimination:  The Supreme Court, Congress, and the Income Tax, 35 
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F. An Emotional Distress Recovery Is Not an Income Item Using the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Analysis 
Even if an emotional distress recovery tax is a capitation or direct tax 
that is not apportioned, this tax could still be considered constitutional if 
the emotional distress recovery is income in the constitutional sense.103  
This author contends that what Congress did in the 1996 Act, by making 
an emotional distress recovery taxable in a nonphysical personal injury, 
was to declare that an emotional distress recovery is income in a 
statutory sense.  This declaration occurred in two instances:  when 
Congress stated in § 104(a)(2) that emotional distress shall not be treated 
as a physical personal injury or physical sickness, and when Congress 
stated in legislative history that an exclusion from gross income does not 
apply to any damages received on a claim of employment discrimination 
or injury to reputation accompanied by a claim of emotional distress.  
However, these statements do not give Congress the power to make 
emotional distress recoveries an item of taxable income in the 
constitutional sense.  Thus, even if an emotional distress recovery may be 
defined to be income in the statutory sense, the tax on emotional distress 
recoveries is unconstitutional as long as the emotional distress recovery 
is not income in the constitutional sense.104  
Section 61(a)’s legislative history sets forth the statutory meaning of 
income, expressly subjecting the term income to a definition based on the 
U.S. Constitution.105  Because the Sixteenth Amendment does not define 
                                                                                                                                  
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 447, 449–50, 497 (1998) (“Under this so-called ‘in lieu of’ principle, 
whether the harm is physical is irrelevant.  Instead, in all personal injury cases, damages 
for lost earnings should be taxable and damages for pain and suffering should be 
excludable.”).  But see Patrick E. Hobbs, The Personal Injury Exclusion:  Congress Gets Physical 
but Leaves the Exclusion Emotionally Distressed, 76 NEB. L. REV. 51, 56, 94 (1997) (advocating a 
total repeal of the personal injury exclusion both in its physical and nonphysical aspects). 
103 See Part IV.D; see also Comm’r v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 217 F.2d 56, 58 (1954) (“The 
[Sixteenth] Amendment allows a tax on ‘income’ without apportionment, but an 
unapportioned direct tax on anything that is not income would still, under the rule of the 
Pollock case, be unconstitutional.”); Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 378 
(1934) (holding that tax on the rental value of a building by its owner is a direct tax because 
income is not involved); Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470, 481 (1929) (stating that the “Sixteenth 
Amendment confers no power upon Congress to define and tax as income without 
apportionment something which theretofore could not have been properly regarded as 
income”); Edwards v. Cuba R.R., 268 U.S. 628, 631–32 (1925) (“The Sixteenth Amendment, 
like other laws authorizing or imposing taxes, is to be taken as written and is not to be 
extended beyond the meaning clearly indicated by the language used.”); Pollack II, 158 U.S. 
601 (1895); Pollack I, 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Jensen, supra note 75, at 1147; Maule, supra note 5, 
at A-13. 
104 See Part IV.D; see also supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
105 See Part II.A. 
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the phrase “taxes on incomes” or indicate whether income means gross 
income or net income,106 constitutional interpretation rules become the 
focal point.  
Constitutional interpretation generally includes a review of the text, 
the framer’s intent, the underlying purpose of the Constitution, judicial 
precedent, and consideration of justice and social policy.107  Originalists 
view these items from the time of the Constitution’s adoption, and 
nonoriginalists view these items as evolving concepts.108  
In assessing the Constitution’s underlying purpose along with justice 
and social policy, a basic sense of fairness evolved in constitutional 
interpretation, as represented by the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses.109  The Equal Protection Clause, which provides that people in 
similar situations ought to be treated similarly, is like the basic tax policy 
of horizontal equity, which provides that people with similar incomes 
ought to pay similar taxes.110  
In Eisner v. Macomber,111 a definition of income in the constitutional 
sense appeared under the 1916 Act, and the Court found that there must 
be a gain before it is considered income in the constitutional sense.112  In 
                                                          
106 See Maule, supra note 5, at A-13. 
107 Majorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of 
Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1992). 
108 Id. at 4. 
109 See id. at 25–26. 
110 Id. 
111 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
112 Macomber, 252 U.S. at 206–07; Kornhauser, supra note 107, at 9-10.  The Macomber Court 
showed that the concept of income is not infinite.  The Court stated: 
A proper regard for [the Sixteenth Amendment] genesis, as well as its 
very clear language, requires also that this Amendment shall not be 
extended by loose construction, so as to repeal or modify, except as 
applied to income, those provisions of the Constitution that require an 
apportionment according to population for direct taxes upon property, 
real and personal.  This limitation still has an appropriate and 
important function, and is not to be overridden by Congress or 
disregarded by the courts. . . .  [I]t becomes essential to distinguish 
between what is and what is not “income”. . . .  Congress cannot by 
any definition it may adopt conclude the matter, since it cannot by 
legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power 
to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be 
lawfully exercised. 
Macomber, 252 U.S. at 206; see also Jensen, supra note 79, at 1144–45 (stating that while 
Glenshaw Glass Co. found Macomber’s definition of income to be too narrow in deciding that 
punitive damages were income even though they were not derived from labor or capital, 
Macomber still remains viable if interpreted to mean that a tax imposed on capital rather 
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Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka113 and Glenshaw Glass Co., this 
concept of income was broadened by application of the Constitution’s 
intent to ultimately define income as all “accessions to wealth, clearly 
realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.”114  
Even though the seminal judicial decisions of Macomber and Glenshaw 
Glass Co. involved earlier versions of the statutory gross income 
provisions of the 1913, 1918, and 1939 Acts, the Court has held that the 
changes in the language from then until today do not change the 
analysis.115  
Because recoveries for personal injury were a statutory exclusion 
from income from 1918 until 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet 
addressed the issue of whether compensatory damages, such as 
emotional distress recoveries, constitute income under the Sixteenth 
Amendment.116  The two most recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court involving taxation of discrimination both focused on statutory 
interpretation because the constitutional definition of income was not at 
issue.117  
The opinions in Burke, Schleier, and O’Gilvie reaffirm the exclusion of 
emotional distress recoveries from income in a discrimination case or 
other tort-type case under the pre-1996 exclusion from income statute.118  
                                                                                                                                  
than gain from capital is not a tax on income because Macomber survives statutorily under 
I.R.C. § 305(a) (2004) as to proportionate stock dividends).  Macomber is still cited by the 
Supreme Court.  See Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 563 (1991); Jensen, supra 
note 75, at 709, 714 n.92. 
113 255 U.S. 509 (1921). 
114 Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955); see Smietanka, 255 U.S. at 520 
(holding that capital gains are income); see also United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 233 
(1992); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 219–20 (1961) (deciding that wrongful 
appropriations are income in the year received); Kornhauser, supra note 107, at 15–16. 
115 James, 366 U.S. at 219 (claiming the changes in language are technical rather than 
substantive).  This would also apply up until the present, as no significant changes were 
made to § 61(a) in 1986 or through today.  See Income Tax Law of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 166; 
§ 213(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065; see also Maule, supra note 5, at A-13. 
116 See Hubbard, supra note 69, at 741. 
117 See Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 328 (1995) (emphasizing that the taxpayer 
“concedes that his settlement constitutes gross income unless it is expressly excepted . . .”); 
see also Burke, 504 U.S. at 233 (stating “[t]here is no dispute that the settlement awards in 
this case would constitute gross income within the reach of [the statutory definition of 
income]”); Hubbard, supra note 69, at 743. 
118 See Burke, 504 U.S. at 239, 241.  In Burke, the Court stated: 
No doubt discrimination could constitute a “personal injury” for 
purposes of § 104(a)(2) if the relevant cause of action evidenced a tort-
like conception of injury and remedy. . . [such as] jury trials and for 
awards of compensatory and punitive damages . . .  [W]e believe that 
Congress’ decision to permit jury trials and compensatory and 
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In Burke and Schleier, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that the 
intangible harms of discrimination are personal injuries.119  The Supreme 
Court case O’Gilvie implies in dictum that “damages that aim to 
substitute for a victim’s physical or personal well being—personal assets 
that the Government does not tax and would not have taxed had the 
victim not lost them” are not income under the principle that a 
restoration of capital is not income.120  The dicta in these cases can be 
used to predict that the U.S. Supreme Court would find an emotional 
distress recovery not to be income in a discrimination case, negating the 
need to address the recoveries under an exclusion from income statute.   
V.   OVERVIEW OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND TORT REFORM AS IT 
PERTAINS TO PERSONAL INJURY REMEDIES 
A. The Three-Way Tension 
Since 1964, civil rights proponents have lobbied for broad 
compensatory relief, especially for emotional distress, but the business 
sector has lobbied against expansive compensatory relief due to the 
damage done to their bottom line profit.121  With the tension between 
civil rights and tort reform advocates and the added tension to preserve 
the government fisc, a balance between social and economic forces 
produced anti-discrimination statutes that offered inconsistent 
remedies.122  
B. Civil Rights Remedies 
In 1964, the first generation of civil rights acts did not allow remedies 
for intangible harms, such as emotional distress.123  The response was a 
second generation set of laws that offered broad compensatory remedies, 
                                                                                                                                  
punitive damages under the amended Act signals a marked change in 
its conception of the injury redressable by Title VII . . . .   “Monetary 
damages also are necessary to make discrimination victims whole for 
the terrible injury to their careers, to their mental and emotional health, 
and to their self respect and dignity.” 
Id. at 239–41, 239-41 n.12 (quoting, in part, H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 64–65 (1991), 
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 602, 603); see also Schleier, 515 U.S. at 332 n.6 (“We of course 
have no doubt that the intangible harms of discrimination can constitute personal injury, 
and that compensation for such harms may be excludable under § 104(a)(2).”). 
119 See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 332; Burke, 504 U.S. at 239. 
120 See O’Gilvie v United States, 519 U.S. 79, 86 (1996). 
121 See Gerald A. Madek, Tax Treatment of Damages Awarded for Age Discrimination, 12 
AKRON TAX J. 161 (1996). 
122 Id. at 161–62. 
123 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2003) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also 
Madek, supra note 121, at 161. 
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including intangible harms such as emotional distress or liquidated 
damages.124  
The third generation of anti-discrimination laws provided for jury 
trials and a broad range of compensatory relief, which included 
emotional distress recoveries and punitive damages.125  To curb this new 
wave of excludability from income, Congress stepped in to enact an 
amended § 104(a)(2) in 1996 to tax nonphysical personal injuries and to 
explicitly name discrimination claims as taxable, which includes the 
emotional distress recovery component.126  
C. Tort Reform Background 
The civil rights era was also juxtaposed with massive tort reform at 
both the federal and state levels.127  In the late 1960s, physician 
malpractice insurance premiums increased in response to a purported 
medical malpractice litigation crisis, which increased medical treatment 
costs.128  In the 1970s, manufacturers’ insurance rates surged due to an 
alleged overflow of products liability litigation.129  In the 1980s, 
insurance companies refused to reissue policies to high-risk holders, 
asserting a general tort crisis.130  By 1988, forty-eight states had 
participated in tort reform; forty-eight percent of these states imposing 
caps on the amounts recoverable, fifty-two percent attacking either the 
availability or amount of punitive damages, and twenty-one percent 
placing limits on noneconomic damages.131  
The 1996 amendment to § 104(a)(2) came right during “this backdrop 
of developing congressional civil rights and tort reform legislation.”132  
“Congressional statements that ‘substantial litigation’ has occurred 
                                                          
124 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610–14 (1988).  Section 3613(c) indicates that Title VIII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1968 fair housing remedies are tort-like with jury trials and compensatory and 
punitive damages.  42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (1988); see also The Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (1999) (offering back pay and liquidated damages); 
Madek, supra note 121, at 171, 176 (asserting that liquidated damages often went undefined 
and thus could be labeled as either compensatory or punitive). 
125 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 234–35 (1992); see 
also Madek, supra note 121, at 179–80. 
126 See § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838, 1928–29; H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-737, at 300–02 (1996), 
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1792–94. 
127 See Wolff, supra note 57, at 1429. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 1429–30. 
131 Id. at 1430–31. 
132 Id. at 1434. 
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concerning cases not involving physical injury or physical sickness and 
that ‘taxation . . . should not depend on the type of claim made,’ clearly 
evidence legislative back door tort reform.”133 
D. The Sexual Stereotypes of Emotional Distress Injury Must Be Dispelled 
The forerunners of tort law were Trespass and Trespass on the 
Case.134  In 1773, the distinction was made between whether the 
defendant intended or carelessly caused the harm.  Trespass signified 
instances where the defendant directly caused the injuries to the 
plaintiff, and Trespass on the Case signified instances where the 
defendant indirectly caused the injury to the plaintiff.135  Thus, the 
ancestor of negligence was the action of Trespass on the Case, “where 
the matter affected was not tangible or the injury was not immediate but 
consequential.”136 
The English tort law then adopted the reasonable man standard in 
negligence actions,137 which made the objective standard gender-
biased.138  At the time, nineteenth century England regarded women as 
emotional beings who were property and disenfranchised.139 
Thus, injury to emotions did not seem to constitute harm to the 
reasonable man.140  This was seen most prominently in the early 
emotional distress decision of Lynch v. Knight.141  The Lynch case 
involved a defamation action, where Lord Wensleydale held that a 
husband suffers a monetary loss as a result of the loss of consortium of 
his wife, but that the wife suffers only emotional and mental injury from 
the loss of consortium of her husband.142  While this material/emotional 
                                                          
133 Id. at 1437 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-586, at 142–44 (1996), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1755, 1838–39); see Hubbard, supra note 69, at 745 (claiming that the 
reason why Congress limited this exclusion to physical personal injuries and physical 
sickness was not expressly stated in the Committee Reports, but speculation is that it was 
used as a tool for tort reform); see also Robert Cate Illig, Tort Reform and the Tax Code:  An 
Opportunity To Narrow the Personal Injuries Exemption, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1459, 1461 (1995) 
(discussing the exclusion from 1918–1995). 
134 See Patrick Kelley, Infancy, Insanity, and Infirmity in the Law of Torts, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 179, 
181 (2003). 
135 Scott v. Shepherd, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (1773). 
136 1 AM. JUR. 2D Actions § 23 (2003). 
137 Vaughn v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492 (1837); see also Wolff, supra note 57, at 1471. 
138 See Wolff, supra note 57, at 1471. 
139 Id. at 1476–77. 
140 Id. 
141 See generally Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (1861) (displaying the English 
Common Law sexual stereotypes). 
142 Id. 
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dichotomy has been overturned by medical research that demonstrates 
that emotional and physical pain are not quantitatively different, victims 
of dignitary torts, such as discrimination, may still be stereotyped as 
weak and their emotional distress claims stereotyped as trivial.143 
This reasonable man gender bias may also be seen today in the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress cases.144  In these cases, states 
often require the presence of physical illness or physical consequences, 
that the plaintiff must be placed in physical danger by the defendant’s 
conduct, or that the plaintiff must show serious mental distress.145 
The emotional distress from the loss of dignity or other intangible 
harm in a nonphysical personal injury is as economically and socially 
important as physical personal injury, which now enjoys tax relief.146  
Reinstating nonphysical personal injury to a tax status equal to physical 
personal injury would again remove the reasonable man gender bias of 
the English common law concerning emotional distress. 
The last vestiges of following the sexual stereotypes of the English 
common law system in our taxation of emotional distress recoveries 
need to be severed.  Our U.S. Constitution, the tax doctrines found in 
reparation rights tax relief, and our U.S. Supreme Court cases require the 
conclusion that emotional distress recoveries are not income147 because 
these recoveries are a return of human capital,148 a mere restoration of 
civil or personal rights,149 fall under the “in lieu of” test,150 or fall under 
horizontal equity.151 
                                                          
143 Wolff, supra note 57, at 1479–80. 
144 Id. at 1473; see also J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Getting Physical:  Excluding 
Personal Injury Awards Under the New Section 104(a)(2), 58 MONT. L. REV. 167, 184 (1997) 
(suggesting that the 1996 change to include in taxable income nonphysical personal injury 
recoveries was due to a fundamental distrust in the reality of emotional distress, or was 
done to establish a bright-line test for administrative convenience).  Few tort reform 
proposals advocate eliminating emotional distress damages for intentional torts such as 
assault.  However, most proposals criticize authorization of emotional distress damages 
where the claim is based primarily on negligence or strict liability torts.  Thus, singling out 
nonphysical personal injuries as the avenue for tort reform is inconsistent with virtually all 
tort reform proposals.  Hubbard, supra note 69, at 766 n.111. 
145 Wolff, supra note 57, at 1474. 
146 Id. at 1344. 
147 See supra Parts III.A–C, IV.F. 
148 See supra Part III.A. 
149 See supra Part III.B. 
150 See supra Part III.C. 
151 See supra Part IV.F. 
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E. Dispelling the Sexual Stereotypes of Emotional Distress Injury Fosters Our 
Tort Reform and Civil Rights Movement  
Several commentators have remarked that taxable awards in 
discrimination cases have hindered the tort reform advocates’ goal of 
limiting awards and claims.152  One commentator suggests that the 
taxability of awards in discrimination cases will prompt these 
discrimination claimants to seek higher monetary settlements to secure a 
fair settlement after taxation, with the employers bearing that increased 
cost.153  Another commentator contends that the 1996 amendment taxing 
nonphysical personal injury cases will result in fewer negotiated 
settlements in employment discrimination and dignitary tort cases, 
causing more rather than less trials.154  Yet another commentator 
postulates that jurors, knowing that these awards are taxable, will 
provide higher litigation awards, which in turn will lead to higher 
insurance premiums.155  Finally, this author shows how the taxability of 
emotional distress recoveries in nonphysical personal injuries, such as 
discrimination cases, will cause litigation on constitutional grounds.   
On the other hand, the proposed resurrection of the dual and equal 
exclusion for emotional distress recoveries in both physical and 
nonphysical personal injury and sickness claims dispels the sexual 
stereotypes from the English common law and allows emotional distress 
recoveries in nonphysical personal injury claims to be as economically or 
socially important as in physical personal injury claims.156  This will also 
reinstate an equal protection of laws to ensure that emotional distress 
recoveries in nonphysical personal injury claims are treated as equal to 
physical personal injury claims. 
Under the amended § 104(a)(2), emotional distress recoveries in 
nonphysical personal injuries are now taxable and therefore must be 
regarded as economic damages to sustain their taxability as income.  
However, under proposed federal tort reform, emotional distress 
                                                          
152 Carole N. Roche, Recent Developement:  Commissioner v. Schleier:  Monetary Awards 
Resulting from Claims of Discrimination Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 (“ADEA”) Are Not Excludable From Gross Income for Purposes of Income Taxation, 26 U. 
BALT. L.F. 43, 45 (1995); see also Burke & Friel, supra note 144, at 188; John W. Dostert, 
Commissioner v. Schleier:  Adding Insult to “Personal Injury?”, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1641, 1679, 
1679  n.265 (1996). 
153 See Roche, supra note 152, at 45. 
154 See Burke & Friel, supra note 144, at 188. 
155 See Dostert, supra note 152, at 1679 n.265. 
156 See supra Part V.D. 
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recoveries are regarded as noneconomic damages.157  Persons who are 
entitled to such recoveries now have these recoveries taxed as economic 
damages in nonphysical personal injuries even when tort reformers 
propose to limit emotional distress recoveries in medical malpractice 
cases as noneconomic damages.  This inconsistency, defining emotional 
distress recoveries as economic damages for the purpose of taxation and 
then defining emotional distress recoveries as noneconomic damages for 
the purpose of limiting awards by tort reformers, cannot continue.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As analyzed in Part III, the administrative history of personal injury 
rights and reparation rights recoveries provides precedent 
demonstrating that emotional distress recoveries are not income items.  
Thus, the use of the specific statutory exclusion from income, as 
discussed in Part II, is not necessary.  This is because these recoveries 
have been held not to be income, as they constitute return of human 
capital or reimbursement for the loss of personal or civil rights. 
The administrative history is based on court precedent.  This court 
precedent, as illustrated in Part IV, is also founded upon the U.S. 
Constitution using rules of constitutional interpretation.  
There appears to be no U.S. Supreme Court precedent that has 
reviewed the authority of Congress to define emotional distress 
recoveries as an income item in the constitutional sense or to tax 
emotional distress recoveries without apportionment.  The dicta in Burke, 
Schleier, and O’Gilvie reaffirms that emotional distress recoveries are not 
income under the tax doctrines of the return of human capital, the 
reimbursement for the loss of personal or civil rights, or the “in lieu of” 
test.  If emotional distress recoveries are not an income item in the 
constitutional sense, then Congress has no constitutional ability to place 
them in a taxable income category by statute or to tax them without 
apportionment. 
In Part V, the resurrection of the dual and equal exclusion for 
emotional distress recoveries in both physical and nonphysical personal 
injury claims dispels the final vestiges of the sexual stereotypes found in 
the English common law.  Further, the resurrection allows emotional 
distress recoveries in nonphysical personal injury claims to be as 
                                                          
157  Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 512 nn.9, 22 (2005). 
Quigley: Reparation Rights Tax Relief Restores Human Rights as a Civil Rig
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005
70 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
economically and socially important as physical personal injury 
recoveries.   
This resurrection also stops the inconsistent treatment of emotional 
distress recoveries, where tort reformers label these recoveries as 
noneconomic damages while Congress taxes these same recoveries 
under the guise of economic damages.  The interests of human rights’ 
and civil rights’ advocates as well as the tort reformers can be merged by 
allowing a statutory exclusion for emotional distress recoveries in all 
personal injury and sickness claims.158   
This in turn will avoid litigation challenging the constitutionality of 
taxing emotional distress recoveries as an item of income.  It will also 
avoid litigation challenging the taxation of emotional distress recoveries 
as a violation of the tax policy of horizontal equity, which is comparable 
to a violation of equal protection by failing to tax those similarly situated 
in a similar fashion. 
Do Americans have the moral authority to punish international 
oppressors and terrorists that deny human rights and civil rights without 
affirming America’s own commitment to civil rights?  If the answer is no, 
then the solution requires reinstating the statutory, judicial, and 
administrative tax relief exclusions for emotional distress recoveries in 
nonphysical personal injury and sickness claims that existed in the 
United States from 1918–1996. 
                                                          
158 See Luong, supra note 62, at 263 (proposing the political interest convergence theory 
“[b]ased on the premise that dominant culture constructs its social reality in ways that 
promote its own self-interests”). 
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